–Rajeev Ahmed–

Once upon a time, in a land far away from the bustling Ganges Delta, a bunch of people in powdered wigs signed a piece of paper called the Declaration of Independence. Unbeknownst to them, on the other side of the globe, Bengal, with its weavers, spices, and magnificent rivers, was busy grappling with the oppressive clutches of another colonial power-one far more brutal in its bookkeeping and tea taxation, the British colonialists. The Americans who broke free, created a global behemoth called the United States, while Bengal-well, after much more drama, centuries of bloodshed, and a couple of flag changes-became Bangladesh. Fast forward a few hundred years, and the two are no longer just curious footnotes in each other’s history but key players in the global geopolitical chessboard.

Now, the post-Hasina era has dawned in Bangladesh. Enter Dr. Yunus-Nobel Peace Prize winner, microcredit architect, and the country’s newest interim government head. Dr. Yunus isn’t just planting metaphorical trees; he’s steering a country whose importance in the geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geostrategic chess game is quickly rising. Like a crucial pawn, Bangladesh sits at the intersection of India, China, and the ever-watchful eyes of the United States, increasingly becoming the focus of American interests in the Indo-Pacific.

The US has realized it’s a smart move to cozy up to Bangladesh-because, let’s face it, the US isn’t exactly known for its subtlety in foreign policy. They’re now eyeing this South Asian economic tiger cub with the kind of interest previously reserved for its more boisterous neighbors, India and China.

But before we light the firecrackers and start sketching out menus for state dinners with Biden or whoever takes the helm next, the complexities of a Bangladesh-US relationship in the post-Hasina era are anything but trivial. Bangladesh’s growing strategic value, especially as it thrives on balancing relations between global powerhouses like India and China, complicates things.

The US sees an opportunity to pull Bangladesh further away from Beijing’s clutches and to use Dhaka as a pawn-or rather a rook-in its grand strategy to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. Let’s not pretend that Washington is here purely for the sake of friendship or democracy. With Dr. Yunus at the helm, you can expect more of the same backdoor diplomacy that usually smells like a mix of neoliberal economic reforms and military cooperation. Oh, and of course, an occasional lecture on democracy, which might go down as well.

But let’s talk brass tacks. Economically, Bangladesh is riding a wave of industrial growth, and the United States is the largest single market for Bangladeshi exports. Apparel, the linchpin of Bangladesh’s economy, finds itself in millions of American closets. A closer US-Bangladesh relationship would likely boost trade, maybe even get some tech investment flowing in. But this relationship, while lucrative, would also come with strings-think more pressure on labor rights, environmental concerns, and, of course, an eye toward how Bangladesh is handling China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments. If Washington starts playing hardball with tariffs or sanctions under the guise of ethical sourcing, Dhaka could face an economic dilemma.

Culturally, a stronger relationship with the US could provide an intriguing shift in the perception of Bangladesh on the global stage. No longer just a footnote in South Asia, it could gain a more independent identity, shedding the narrative of being stuck between India and Pakistan’s age-old bickering. But it would also invite a cultural clash-American neoliberal individualism vs. Bangladeshi collectivist values rooted in community and religion. There’s nothing quite like trying to explain to a room full of American diplomats why your country prefers community-based decision-making over hyper-individualistic capitalism.

Diplomatically, Bangladesh’s balancing act between the US, India, and China would become even more complicated. A closer relationship with Washington risks ruffling the feathers of Beijing and New Delhi, both of whom view Bangladesh as a strategic partner. India, the big brother next door, shares historical, cultural, and military ties with Bangladesh, while China has been instrumental in infrastructure development through BRI investments. How would India feel about the US getting too chummy with Dhaka? Spoiler alert: not great. India, while enjoying its own tango with the US, doesn’t like the idea of Bangladesh becoming too independent in its foreign policy, let alone taking sides against its interests. Meanwhile, China would see any US foothold in Dhaka as a direct threat to its Belt and Road ambitions. That’s one way to get Beijing’s politburo to lose sleep.

Bangladesh’s relations with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Middle Eastern countries could also face some interesting recalibrations. For all the talk about religious solidarity, we know it’s often more about remittance flows and low-wage jobs for millions of Bangladeshi workers than about true spiritual brotherhood. A stronger US presence in Bangladesh could make these Middle Eastern powers nervous. The US has its complicated, oil-laced relationship with the Middle East, and any shift in the Bangladesh-US dynamic might invite some diplomatic balancing acts in the Gulf. At the same time, Bangladesh wouldn’t want to jeopardize the vital remittances from migrant workers in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. The situation could make one wonder if Bangladesh is destined to become the global equivalent of a tightrope walker without a safety net.

Russia, well, Russia will do what Russia does best-play the disgruntled but opportunistic sidekick. Bangladesh-Russia relations have never been as dramatic as Moscow’s dealings with other countries, but they have shared a cordial, if somewhat distant, relationship. A closer US relationship might put some strain on this, especially given current global tensions. Russia might retaliate with trade restrictions or lower cooperation on defense agreements, but honestly, compared to its current tango with Ukraine and the West, Bangladesh isn’t going to be its number one headache. Dhaka can only hope Moscow doesn’t start seeing it as a piece on the US-NATO chessboard.

To address the challenges posed by a closer relationship with the US, Bangladesh must walk a fine line. First, it should ensure that its relationship with China remains intact. China’s investments in infrastructure, technology, and trade are too crucial to simply abandon. Dhaka will have to embrace the role of a master tightrope walker, balancing US interests in regional security with China’s economic muscle. Bangladesh can leverage its importance as a bridge between India and China, maintaining strategic neutrality while subtly playing both sides for maximum benefit.

Bangladesh must also handle the regional tensions with India delicately. It should work to maintain the current level of cooperation on issues like water sharing, counterterrorism, and cross-border trade while preventing India from seeing the US-Bangladesh partnership as a direct affront to its regional dominance. A more independent foreign policy that focuses on Bangladesh’s national interests-rather than acting as a satellite state of India or China-will be key here. If Dr. Yunus can navigate this balancing act, Bangladesh could potentially evolve into a regional powerhouse in its own right.

(The writer is Editor of Geopolits.com and the author of the book titled Bengal Nexus)