TDS Desk:

With only five days remaining before the thirteenth parliamentary election, Bangladesh’s interim government, led by Chief Adviser Dr Muhammad Yunus, continues to sign a series of international agreements and memoranda of understanding. These include an economic partnership agreement with Japan and a deal covering the transfer of defence equipment and technology. A counter-tariff trade agreement with the United States is also due to be signed three days before the poll.

The government has also pushed ahead with handing over operations of the New Mooring Container Terminal (NCT) at Chattogram Port to the UAE’s DP World, ignoring objections from port stakeholders. And in November, the interim administration signed a 33-year agreement with Denmark’s APM Terminals to build and operate the Laldia Container Terminal at Chattogram’s Patenga.

Details of the terms and mutual obligations in several agreements have not been disclosed due to non-disclosure clauses. Several major defence initiatives have also entered discussions since the election schedule was announced, including plans to establish a drone factory under a G-to-G agreement with China, procure J-10CE combat aircraft, JF-17 Thunder combat aircraft from Pakistan, Eurofighter Typhoons from a European consortium and Black Hawk multirole helicopters from the United States.

Experts say that once an election schedule is announced, a government’s primary duty is to prepare the administration to deliver a peaceful and impartial vote. This is particularly important as the country prepares to hold what they describe as an electoral festival after 16 years, making electoral preparations paramount. During this period, they say, a government’s routine duties should be limited to administrative functions.

Analysts argue that although the government’s core mandate was reform, contract negotiation has taken such precedence that the interim government, which assumed power through a mass uprising, has turned into a “geopolitical government”. They say many of the decisions are long-term and could constrain the policy space of a future elected government.

After the fall of Sheikh Hasina amid a student-led mass uprising on August 5, 2024, Bangladesh’s leadership passed to an interim government headed by Dr Muhammad Yunus. The public mandate was clear: to return the state to a democratic path after prolonged authoritarian rule, dismantle entrenched corruption networks, depoliticise the police and bureaucracy, and undertake state reconstruction. The government’s core task essentially was to create a credible environment for elections through state reform.

Yet in the months since assuming power, the administration’s most active, swift and visible decisions have been in sectors that are more geopolitically sensitive and strategically significant than focused on political reform.

Most of the decisions and initiatives that have drawn attention since the interim government assumed office have centred on ports, terminals, energy, foreign investment, international financial institutions, long-term strategic agreements, strategic infrastructure and military procurement. Analysts say that while these moves matter economically, they are not merely administrative or developmental but unequivocally geopolitical. By contrast, visible progress on the reforms that formed the public’s primary expectation of the government has been extremely limited.

Dr M Niaz Asadullah, a visiting professor of economics at the University of Reading in the UK, points to a “double standard” in the interim government’s priorities. He told journalists: “They have shown particular eagerness in foreign agreements, such as in the allocation of the Laldia Container Terminal. Yet such long-term, significant decisions should ordinarily fall within the purview of an elected parliament. On the other hand, highly important internal reforms with strong public support have often been sidelined or pursued at a sluggish pace.”

Highlighting the geopolitical weight of several foreign agreements, Asadullah said: “The signing of the economic partnership agreement with Japan and the MOUs with the Sasakawa Peace Foundation signal a specific strategic alignment. Japan has consistently emerged as a key partner in the regional competition in the Bay of Bengal. By accelerating projects such as the Matarbari deep-sea port and infrastructure initiatives in northeast India, the interim government has effectively tied Bangladesh into a ‘multi-layer connectivity’ framework that is essentially a rival to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The interim government appears to be crafting a long-term geopolitical roadmap, a role whose moral authority should rest solely with a sovereign government elected by the people’s vote.”

Yesterday, the interim government signed an economic partnership agreement with Japan, following a separate agreement on the transfer of defence equipment and technology signed on February 3. It is also set to sign a reciprocal tariff trade agreement with the United States three days before the general election, with the signing scheduled for Monday.

Addressing journalists at the Secretariat on February 1 about the US deal, Commerce Secretary Mahbubur Rahman said: “Bangladesh has a reciprocal tariff rate of 20 percent. Other countries have the same, and some have even higher rates. However, we hope it may be reduced somewhat.” Asked about the possible purchase of Boeing aircraft from the United States, he added: “The issue of buying aircraft is under discussion. Plans to increase aviation capacity predated this agreement with the United States. Negotiations are ongoing on the timing of deliveries, pricing and configuration.”

Security analyst Imtiaz Ahmed said most of the government’s recent decisions are geopolitically sensitive. He told journalists: “There is no precedent for signing such policy agreements or making major decisions one week before an election. Internationally, this is not generally regarded as a norm or good practice. The government’s recent activity clearly shows it is prioritising geopolitically sensitive issues. The recent commotion over the Myanmar corridor issue also points to this tendency.”

Ahmed, who is also a former professor of international relations at the University of Dhaka, warned that such moves would add to future political and diplomatic complexity. “Many in this government have comparatively close ties with the United States and other Western nations. Personally and institutionally, they have long operated within Western networks and funding spheres. If those who criticised the previous government for failures in law, transparency and accountability now follow the same path of secrecy or unilateral decision-making, public faith in civil society and policymaking groups will erode,” he said.

During Sheikh Hasina’s 15-and-a-half years in power, relations with India deepened while ties with Pakistan fell to their lowest point. Many analysts say relations with Pakistan have shifted significantly under the interim administration since the Awami League government was toppled in the July Uprising. That shift has taken on added significance with the recent back-to-back visits to Dhaka by two Pakistani ministers. Observers say the trips go beyond routine bilateral courtesies and may be intended to send a strategic signal amid shifting South Asian geopolitics.

After taking office, the interim government prioritised the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar. In March last year, the chief adviser said a joint effort with the UN would aim to enable Rohingya to return to their homes in Myanmar’s Rakhine state in time for the next Eid. No progress has followed. Instead, more than 100,000 Rohingya have entered Bangladesh over the past year. While senior officials, including the foreign affairs adviser, have repeatedly used various platforms to call for a resolution of the Rohingya crisis and increased humanitarian assistance, the interim government’s appeals have gone unanswered. International aid for the Rohingya community in Bangladesh has fallen to less than half of what is required.

By contrast, Myanmar’s military junta is in a comparatively favourable geopolitical position. It is seeking to present its recent controversial election as a “path back to normalcy” and enjoys unqualified support from Russia and China at multiple levels, leaving it in a comfortable position.

Since taking office, the Yunus-led interim government has launched several major initiatives in defence and other sectors. These include signing a G–to–G agreement with China Electronics Technology Group Corporation International to establish a drone manufacturing and assembly plant and transfer technology. Discussions have also emerged on the purchase of JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft from Pakistan. The administration has also moved to procure 20 Chinese-made fighter jets at a cost exceeding BDT 150 billion and has signed an expression of interest with Italy’s Leonardo S.p.A. to purchase Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft. In parallel, talks have covered acquiring submarines from South Korea, T129 attack helicopters from Turkey and Black Hawk multirole helicopters from the United States.

In November last year, the interim government signed a 33-year contract with Denmark’s APM Terminals to build and operate the Laldia Terminal at Patenga. It has also awarded a 22-year contract to Switzerland’s Medlog SA to manage the Pangaon Inland Container Terminal near Dhaka. The process of handing over operations of Chattogram Port’s New Mooring Container Terminal to the UAE’s DP World has also advanced.

Dr Sajjad M Jasimuddin, senior professor and head of Geopolitics Lab at KEDGE Business School in France, says it is entirely inappropriate for a government to enter into major strategic agreements or take such decisions so close to an election. Speaking to journalists, he said: “The government should have acted transparently, consulted stakeholders and left the final decision to an elected administration, given the long-term implications. Instead, the opposite picture is emerging. This raises suspicions that the rush may be driven by personal or group interests behind certain decisions.”

“Such activity calls the government’s priorities and objectives into question,” he added. Citing the Boeing purchase talks, he said: “Taking such a large and strategic decision is too much for an interim government. It would place a future government under pressure and could push the state into unnecessary political and diplomatic complications.”

The interim government has been accused of moving hastily to lease the New Mooring Container Terminal at the Chattogram Port to DP World, overriding objections from port stakeholders. In protest, port workers have begun an indefinite work stoppage, paralysing operations at the port. At the same time, the government has concluded multiple international agreements and memoranda at an unusual pace. Full details of the terms of these agreements remain unclear. Some observers argue that the initiatives may involve state security and vital national interests. Analysts say that on the eve of a transfer of power, it would have been more prudent to leave such decisions to approval by parliament and a representative government. They note that agreements affecting the state’s trade, security and economic foundations require sustained discussion, review and negotiation.

The interim government’s primary focus should have been on ensuring a fair and credible election, said Maj Gen (retd) Fazle Elahi Akbar, chairman of the Foundation for Strategic and Development Studies. He told journalists, “The interim government now has less than a week. Signing agreements on such matters at this stage naturally raises questions about their justification. It would have been better to refrain from decisions, especially on geopolitically sensitive issues. Such policy choices should have been left to an elected government. At most, the interim administration could have prepared policy drafts or roadmaps. Its current initiatives will create unnecessary pressure and complications for a future government.”

Observers also note that many advisers in the interim government do not reside permanently in the country, and there are allegations that some hold dual citizenship. In these circumstances, analysts say, public doubt and suspicion are bound to grow if critical national-interest agreements appear to be rushed through without sufficient consultation with stakeholders and political forces.

Former ambassador Humayun Kabir said, “While a government has the authority to act out of state necessity, there’s a clear lack of transparency in the recent spate of agreements and MoUs. Major decisions should rest on transparency and accountability. The deficit in accountability here is raising questions and confusing the public. Greater procedural caution was needed. Doubts persist over whether these agreements are being made with proper assessment, risk analysis and consideration of stakeholder views.”

In his view, “The public’s main expectation of this government was reform, and people don’t believe that has been met. Instead, the particular zeal and priorities of some advisers have prompted questions and concern among the public.”