TDS Desk:

More than a decade ago, Japan launched the Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt, widely known as BIG-B, to promote economic integration, port development, and industrialisation around the Bay of Bengal. Anchored on the planned deep-sea port at Matarbari, the mega project was conceived as a strategic pillar of Japan’s presence in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal, positioned as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Today, that ambition is running up against harsher geopolitical realities. Momentum stalled in 2022 after Japan’s economic slowdown and Sri Lanka’s sovereign default. Analysts say the project has since been exposed to rising political instability, diplomatic strain, and fragile governance across the region.

Japan designed BIG-B with Bangladesh as its central hub. Under the plan, Chattogram would continue to function as an established port and industrial city, sustaining import and export flows. Matarbari, by contrast, was earmarked as a purpose-built deep-sea port and energy hub, linking industrial production, power and fuel supply, and port-based logistics in a single system. The network envisaged road and rail corridors allowing India’s West Bengal and north-eastern states to use Bangladeshi ports for direct access to the Bay of Bengal. Similar arrangements were proposed for landlocked Nepal and Bhutan, with goods moving overland into Bangladesh before export through Matarbari or Chattogram, cutting both cost and transit time. Myanmar was cast as a transit corridor between South and Southeast Asia. Thailand and other Southeast Asian economies were to be included in the network as extensions of regional value chains.

As part of the initiative, Japan committed substantial investment to improve connectivity between Bangladesh and India’s north-eastern states. Construction of the Matarbari deep-sea port and its associated energy infrastructure was promoted as the project’s flagship. Planners argued the port would open a new commercial gateway not only for Bangladesh but also for India’s northeast and for landlocked Nepal and Bhutan. Stronger industrial links with Southeast Asia’s manufacturing centres were also expected to follow. That outlook has dimmed since the fall of Sheikh Hasina on August 5, 2024 and the subsequent strain in Bangladesh–India relations. Analysts say the uncertainty now surrounding bilateral ties is casting a long shadow over BIG-B’s future. The concept rests on hinterland-to-sea connectivity, and that foundation is increasingly at risk. Without effective regional cooperation between Dhaka and New Delhi, they warn, the project would be close to unworkable.

Abdul Haque, former president of the Japan-Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said the initiative had been temporarily disrupted by shifts in the regional situation. Speaking to journalists, he added, “Discussion on the project has all but stopped. But Japan hasn’t abandoned it. Its appeal and strategic value remain intact and will continue to do so. Regional connectivity projects of this scale are essential for Bangladesh. Similarly, such projects carry clear practical value for India as well. At the outset, India’s interest was unmistakable.”

He said a positive shift could follow once an elected government takes office in Bangladesh. “In the wake of tariff disputes (with the United States),” he added, “India should take a more active role. South Asia needs to be viewed as a single economic space rather than through the lens of rivalry. If there is a serious effort to build an integrated market, initiatives like BIG-B are achievable.”

Experts also point to structural constraints facing Nepal and Bhutan. The primary obstacle is not domestic politics but dependence on transit corridors. Both countries are landlocked. Access to the Bay of Bengal for both countries requires routes through India and Bangladesh. As a result, their stake in BIG-B is inseparable from the state of Dhaka–Delhi relations. When tensions rise between the two neighbours, prospects for Nepal and Bhutan under the BIG-B framework become uncertain as well.

Asked about the outlook for BIG-B, Professor Delwar Hossain of the International Relations Department at University of Dhaka told journalists that India was treated as a major variable when the project was first conceived. He added, “The connectivity model was built around Bangladesh as the hub. Yet the project also hinges on the strategic weight of neighbouring regions and on Bangladesh’s relations with surrounding countries. Those factors are now working against it. Japan’s ties with China are deteriorating. Bangladesh–India relations remain strained. Myanmar, meanwhile, has been unstable for years.”

Japan–Bangladesh relations have not seen a fundamental shift so far, but changes may lie ahead, according to Professor Hossain. He added, “Japan is likely to feel increasingly uncomfortable as Bangladesh draws closer to China. Even if Bangladesh is considered on its own merits, Japan’s broader strategic calculus and its effort to counter China are more closely bound up with India. Strengthening ties with India is central to Japan’s approach to counter China.” Taken together, he argued, conditions are not favourable for BIG-B at present.

Myanmar is another country of strategic importance to the project. There, the most serious obstacles stem from prolonged political turmoil and an acute security crisis. Since the military coup, nationwide armed conflict, weak junta control, and international sanctions have combined to cast doubt over implementation. Japan’s plans had envisaged Myanmar as a key transit corridor between South and Southeast Asia. However, road, rail, and port connectivity is close to impossible under current conditions. The Myanmar segment, as a result, has become the weakest and most uncertain link in the BIG-B network.

Sri Lanka’s recent economic experience has created a separate set of constraints. Colombo reset its priorities after the country defaulted in 2022. In Japan’s original vision, Sri Lanka could have emerged as a critical node in the Bay of Bengal network through ports and logistics. The financial crisis changed that trajectory. Debt restructuring, guidance from the International Monetary Fund, and fiscal pressure have pushed Sri Lanka away from large-scale projects.

Researchers describe Bay of Bengal countries as exhibiting low economic, political, and security resilience. Governance systems across the region are often characterised as fragile. That weakness translates into limited institutional capacity, inconsistent policy, and administrative constraints, all of which undermine the delivery of large infrastructure and connectivity schemes. In such conditions, long-term projects like BIG-B are inherently exposed to risk.

China’s own strategy in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, anchored in the Belt and Road Initiative, presents another major geopolitical challenge. Over the past decade, Beijing has built extensive port, energy, and logistics infrastructure across the region. Many analysts view BIG-B as Japan’s balancing strategy in response. Tokyo sought to develop an alternative industrial and connectivity network to prevent the Bay of Bengal from falling under overwhelming Chinese influence. In practice, however, the scale and reach of the BRI have added further complexity to the BIG-B project.

Some analysts argue that regional instability may disrupt BIG-B in the short term but will not derail Japan’s longer-term strategy. Former ambassador Shahed Akhtar told journalists, “Japan has a vision. They work with long-range planning and careful preparation. The country has conducted extensive research on Bangladesh as well. It also maintains significant investments in Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, and India. Japan is now waiting for a newly elected government in Bangladesh. Tokyo will align its approach once that government sets out its plans, and move forward accordingly.”