TDS Desk:

Bangladesh’s integration into the Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) network has entered a period of uncertainty amid Myanmar’s civil war, long-standing India–Pakistan hostility, and recent diplomatic strains between Bangladesh and India. Over the past 15 years, Bangladesh has invested about BDT 1 trillion in rail infrastructure to join the multilateral network. Yet escalating geopolitical frictions and regional political instability have cast doubt on whether those investments will deliver the regional connectivity and commercial gains once envisaged. With transit and corridor arrangements largely centred on India, any further deterioration in bilateral ties would jeopardise not only Bangladesh’s linkage but the effective implementation of the entire TAR framework, officials and analysts say.

In 2007, Bangladesh signed an agreement to join the Trans-Asian Railway — a global initiative to streamline freight movement across Asia and Europe. The country has since then executed major upgrades to its rail system, including the Chattogram–Cox’s Bazar line, the Padma Bridge, the Padma Bridge rail link, and the Jamuna rail bridge. Together, these four flagship projects cost about BDT 980 billion. The government has also completed a series of complementary projects, among them the Dhaka–Chattogram line upgrade, the Khulna–Mongla rail link, reopening of the Akhaura–Agartala route, and a new line from Pabna to Dhalarchar. Each was designed, in part, to anchor Bangladesh more firmly in the TAR network.

Despite the scale of investment, Bangladesh still lacks a direct rail connection with Myanmar. That gap has blocked practical links with South-East Asia’s rail systems and onward links to China, Malaysia, and other countries in the region. At the same time, the stalemate between India and Pakistan, prolonged political instability in Myanmar, and intensifying geopolitical competition among regional powers have pushed the wider corridor toward uncertainty, according to sector specialists.

Meanwhile, diplomatic friction between Dhaka and New Delhi has deepened following the ouster of Sheikh Hasina amid the student-led uprising on August 5, 2024. Analysts say the strain has injected fresh doubt into rail-based transit and corridor plans. Large sections of the TAR network depend on cross-border movement, transit facilities, and port access for India’s north-eastern states via alternative routes through Bangladesh. These arrangements and concessions could erode if bilateral relations worsen. In such a scenario, plans to build a rail corridor linking north-eastern India, Bangladesh, and sub-regional markets could stall or lose practical relevance.

Bangladesh’s participation in the Trans-Asian Railway has fallen into uncertainty amid Asia’s current diplomatic and geopolitical dynamics, said Fahmida Khatun, executive director of the Centre for Policy Dialogue. “Joining the Trans-Asian Railway is not only about economic investment; it is also inherently geopolitical,” she told journalists. “If relations among stakeholder countries are poor, the project cannot function. That is where we are now. Political tensions persist among several Asian countries, and Bangladesh is part of that. As a result, Bangladesh’s integration into the Trans-Asian Railway has become uncertain. When multiple countries are involved and diplomatic and geopolitical ties do not improve, projects of this kind are simply not feasible.”

Officials at Bangladesh’s Ministry of Railways say the country is currently part of three TAR routes and a fourth proposed route. Route 1 enters Bangladesh at the Gede-Darshana border. It then runs via Ishurdi, the Jamuna Bridge, and Joydebpur to Tongi, before continuing through Akhaura, Chattogram, Dohazari, and Ramu. It then exits into Myanmar at the Gundum border. A sub-route of Route 1 branches from Akhaura and enters India via Shahbazpur in Kulaura.

Route 2 begins at Singhabad in India. It enters Bangladesh through the Rohanpur border in Chapainawabganj and runs via Rajshahi, Abdulpur, and Ishurdi, where it connects with Route 1. Route 3 also starts in India, at Radhikapur. It crosses into Bangladesh through the Birol border in Dinajpur and proceeds via Parbatipur, Abdulpur, and Ishurdi before merging with Route 1.

In addition to these three routes, Bangladesh Railway has proposed another TAR route — starting at Petrapole in India and entering Bangladesh through the Benapole border. It then runs through Jashore, Bhanga, Mawa, Dhaka, and Tongi before joining Route 1. All four routes converge on a 28-kilometre stretch from Ramu in Cox’s Bazar to the Gundum border with Myanmar. No railway line has been built along this section yet.

Bangladesh had earlier initiated construction of the Ramu–Gundum rail link under the Chattogram-Cox’s Bazar railway project. It later withdrew from the plan. Railway officials say Myanmar’s ongoing civil war, a deterioration in bilateral relations, and the presence of Rohingya refugee camps along the proposed route have emerged as key obstacles to implementation.

Commenting on the broader implications, Delwar Hossain, a professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Dhaka, told journalists that Bangladesh’s integration into the TAR network would inevitably slow under current conditions. He added, “It’s true that domestic political instability, strained bilateral relations, and the wider geopolitical environment will reduce momentum. But because multiple countries are involved in such initiatives, they will remain engaged regardless of how the situation evolves and that’s only natural.”

Experts say the TAR network is not any single country’s project. It is a policy-driven, technology-led connectivity concept built on a multilateral framework. But growing geopolitical polarisation has weakened its political foundations. China-led corridors and parallel connectivity networks are advancing rapidly. Traditional multilateral initiatives meanwhile are struggling to secure political backing and trust. As a result, although the project has not faced outright opposition, its pace of implementation has slowed and its strategic relevance has diminished. Analysts argue that the rail corridor remains technically feasible and commercially attractive. But its greatest uncertainty is now political, shaped by regional tensions, security concerns, and a widening trust deficit.

M Humayun Kabir, a former ambassador, told journalists, “The initiative has effectively stalled. Yet if the region’s future needs and expectations are considered, the Trans-Asian Railway was necessary and remains so. Connectivity is essential for economic growth. That connectivity cannot be confined within national borders.”

The current uncertainty, he added, would serve no one in the long run. “That is precisely where hope lies. Countries cannot achieve their development ambitions without connectivity. To secure the growth they seek, there is no alternative to overcoming instability and strengthening regional links. The challenges are real. But necessity will ultimately push the initiative in a positive direction.”

Stakeholders note that the TAR network in South Asia inevitably revolves around India. Geography makes it impossible to build a continuous land corridor that bypasses Delhi. Rail links for Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Pakistan all ultimately depend on Indian tracks. On paper, the westbound route runs from Bangladesh into India via Gede, continuing to Kolkata, Delhi, and Attari, before crossing into Pakistan at Wagah and continuing through Iran and Turkey to Europe. Eastward, the concept rests on a land bridge through Myanmar to South-East Asia. To the north, Afghanistan is envisaged as a gateway to Central Asia. However, a continuous rail corridor linking Afghanistan with South Asia has yet to materialise.

In reality, political tensions grip almost every country on this map. The sharpest fault line lies between India and Pakistan. From a technical standpoint, the Dhaka–Delhi–Lahore–Tehran–Istanbul corridor is largely ready. Track infrastructure exists, gauge-change points have been identified, and freight trains have conducted trial runs over long distances. Still, the corridor remains non-functional. Decades of political deadlock have turned rail connectivity into a security and strategic issue rather than a matter of trade or transit. Recent wars, the Kashmir dispute, border clashes, and severed diplomatic channels have rendered this section of the TAR network effectively unworkable.

Plans for a land link to South-East Asia via India and Myanmar have also stalled because of Myanmar’s internal conflict. Civil war, fighting between the military junta and rebel groups, and chronic border insecurity have transformed the country from a land bridge into a geopolitical buffer zone. The picture is more nuanced for Nepal and Bhutan. Caught between Indian and Chinese competition, both countries move cautiously. Analysts also point to China’s Belt and Road Initiative as a major obstacle to TAR’s implementation. Many countries across South and Central Asia have gravitated towards Chinese corridors in search of rapid financing, visible infrastructure, and political backing. That shift has further eroded the appeal of the consensus-driven, negotiation-heavy Trans-Asian Railway initiative.

Source: Bonik Barta