—Anwar Hossain Manju—

With just two weeks remaining, Bangladesh is set to hold its 13th National Parliamentary Election. After a decade marked by three farcical elections conducted under the Awami League government prior to the July Revolution—elections held without the participation of major political parties and largely without voters—more than 127.7 million voters are now expected to cast their ballots freely in a genuinely competitive election, with the active participation of political parties.

A festive atmosphere has taken hold across the country. The Election Commission has said that the highest number of candidates in the past 30 years are contesting in the 13th parliamentary election. The countdown has begun, with all eyes fixed on 12 February. Free from fears of obstruction by rivals, candidates are going door to door seeking votes. Central leaders of the participating parties are addressing rallies across the country to boost the morale of their candidates and supporters and to present their electoral visions and promises to the public. So far, there have been no reports of any major untoward incidents. Indeed, the election appears to be taking place in a celebratory spirit. A favourable breeze for the restoration of democracy has begun to blow—if this is disrupted for any reason, the country risks once again being plunged into the darkness of the Awami era.

However, Bangladesh’s electoral history is far from reassuring. In 2014, after excluding the main opposition party, the Awami League won 153 of the 300 parliamentary seats uncontested. Yet, according to BBC reports, election-related violence that year left 18 people dead, many injured, and 300 opposition activists arrested. The 2018 election was similarly held amid an opposition boycott and without meaningful voter participation. Even so, AFP and AP reported that 16 people were killed during that election at the hands of the ruling party and law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, before and after the final election held under the Awami League government in 2024—between January and June—a total of 41 people were killed. All these incidents occurred prior to the July Revolution.

The tragic reality, however, is that after the July Revolution—following the fall and flight of Sheikh Hasina—numerous activists and supporters of certain parties have been killed in internal conflicts, particularly over control and occupation of extortion hubs. According to reports published last October based on the Human Rights Support Society (HRSS), between September 2024 and September 2025—a 13-month period—85 out of 160 people killed in political violence died in a major internal conflict. The number of injured BNP activists and supporters stood at 5,017. Clearly, in the absence of the Awami League, internal strife within its main rival alone has been sufficient to drive up casualties. According to a BBC report on 21 January, 91 BNP nomination-deprived leaders are contesting as independent candidates in 50 parliamentary constituencies. It is difficult to expect cordial relations between supporters of rebel candidates and those of officially nominated candidates up to polling day.

Even as the BNP has failed to resolve its internal conflicts, it opened another front after the official election campaign began on Thursday, 22 January. This time, the target is Jamaat-e-Islami, once the BNP’s closest ally. Without the support of Jamaat’s 18 MPs, the BNP could not have formed a government under Begum Khaleda Zia in 1991. Ahead of the 2001 election, Khaleda Zia and other BNP leaders campaigned across the country alongside Jamaat leaders, shared platforms, won the election, and formed a government together with Jamaat. Now, without naming the party, BNP’s top leaders have entered into a war of words. Since the announcement of the election schedule, BNP leaders have intensified their attacks on Jamaat, using language reminiscent of—if not harsher than—that once employed by the Awami League. It is only natural that Jamaat would respond to Tarique Rahman’s signals, and indeed the party’s ameer, Dr Shafiqur Rahman, has criticised him and his party without explicitly naming them.

My questions about the political prudence of Jamaat leaders are long-standing. In 1991, instead of formalising their support through a written agreement, Jamaat leaders enabled Begum Khaleda Zia to become Bangladesh’s first female prime minister in exchange for smiles and verbal assurances. Yet the BNP did not remember this contribution. At the time, the BNP government’s attitude resembled the Bangladeshi proverb, “The mullah ate the sweets but failed to recognise whose favour it was.” Having come to power with Jamaat’s support, the BNP not only forgot Jamaat but, from 1992 onwards, unleashed party activists, affiliated organisations, and even law enforcement personnel against Jamaat and Islami Chhatra Shibir leaders and activists, subjecting them to violent repression.

Jamaat’s role in 1971 did not stand in the way of the BNP seeking its support to form a government in 1991, nor did Jamaat’s alleged actions in 1971 pose any obstacle to the BNP forming a coalition government in 2001. Jamaat raised no objections to Tarique Rahman’s alternative administrative hub, Hawa Bhaban, nor did it oppose unethical decisions such as raising the retirement age of judges from 65 to 67 to engineer a compliant caretaker government in hopes of securing victory in the next election. With these precedents in mind, why has Jamaat suddenly become such a problem for the BNP’s new chairman?

After 17 years, during a rally in Purbachal marking his return to Bangladesh, Tarique Rahman spoke of his dreams. His subsequent speeches were also inspiring and hopeful. Even just a few days ago, he said at an event, “We must practise politics that improves people’s lives, not politics of blame. Politics of blame will not fill people’s stomachs.” Now it appears that he has made a 180-degree turn, stepping into politics of accusation and mudslinging. Is he afraid that, despite Jamaat’s role in 1971, the party has drawn close to a significant section of the public and is posing an obstacle to his potential electoral victory?

Just as the British rulers once adopted a ‘divide and rule’ policy in the subcontinent by drawing lines of division between Hindus and Muslims to govern India securely, the Awami League used the ‘spirit of 1971’ to create divisions among the people of Bangladesh in an effort to perpetuate its authoritarian rule. The core mantra behind Sheikh Hasina’s fifteen-and-a-half years in power was her and her party’s use of the ‘spirit of 1971’. Through this, the Awami League targeted not only Jamaat but also the BNP. Sheikh Hasina even refused to recognise the BNP chairman’s father, former president and proclaimer of independence Ziaur Rahman, as a freedom fighter, attempted to remove his mausoleum, and subjected former Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia to severe persecution, pushing her slowly towards death. Ultimately, however, the people rejected Sheikh Hasina. Many are astonished and dismayed to see Tarique Rahman so quickly forgetting the consequences of her flawed politics.

Are Tarique Rahman and BNP policymakers alarmed by the growing positive sentiment towards Jamaat among a large segment of the population, and by the sweeping victories of Jamaat’s student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, in the student union elections held so far at several public universities—viewing these as ominous signs for the BNP in the national election? Have international media reports suggesting Jamaat’s proximity to power also fuelled BNP’s anxieties? Recent reports by the influential US newspaper The Washington Post and Qatar-based television network Al Jazeera have hardly been encouraging for the BNP.

In a lengthy report headlined “US Seeks to Be ‘Friends’ with Bangladesh’s Once-Banned Islamist Party”, The Washington Post said the country’s largest Islamist party is on track to achieve its best-ever electoral result in the upcoming election, and that US diplomats are planning to strengthen relations with it. Al Jazeera reported that Jamaat-e-Islami, having navigated a complex history of ups and downs, is now closer than ever to a genuine opportunity to assume state power for the first time.

A survey conducted last month (December 2025) by the US-based International Republican Institute showed voter support for the BNP at 33 per cent and for Jamaat at 29 per cent. Another survey conducted in the second week of January by leading Bangladeshi organisations—including Narrative, Projection BD, the International Institute of Law and Diplomacy, and the Jagaran Foundation—found BNP support at 37.7 per cent and Jamaat support at 33.6 per cent. In other words, as the election draws nearer, public support for Jamaat is rising faster than for the BNP. Moreover, Jamaat’s electoral alliance includes nine other small and large political parties. There is little doubt that Jamaat has at least partially dashed the BNP’s hopes of an easy victory. Perhaps for this reason, Tarique Rahman—the BNP’s chief source of hope—appears to be attempting, in the Awami League’s style, to use the ‘spirit of 1971’ as a trump card against Jamaat.

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Author: US-based senior journalist and translator